Suez: The Psychological Victory and Military Defeat

Tuesday marked 56 years since late President Gamal Abdel Nasser declared Suez Canal a nationalized Egyptian company in a move that both made Egyptians rejoice and opened the gates of hell on the nation. The move was followed by the 1956 Suez war and then the 1967 six-day war that left a toll on Egypt’s people and economy. In Nasser’s book The Philosophy of the Revolution, Nasser wrote that history was full of heroes who created roles of glorious valor for themselves and acted them out in decisive moments. For modern Egypt, the nationalization of the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956 must have been that moment. And while that event restored Egyptian dignity, it had far reaching consequences for the region and beyond. Veteran journalist Mohamed Hassanein Heikal may have described the Suez crisis as a “personal duel between two men,” but the roots of conflict lay in Egyptian policy clashing with Western interests. According to Nasser’s Charter of National Action, he wanted to remove the imperialist presence in Egypt, strengthen the military capability, revive the flagging economy and establish democracy. However, in the midst of the Cold War this was not easy. The United States wanted Egypt as a partner against the Soviet Union. Nasser, although not averse to US overtures, could not accept the proposition that the USSR was a greater threat than the British. In spite of Egyptian independence, the former colonial power still had troops in the Canal zone and was at that very moment trying to isolate this area from the region. Nasser could not help but view US intentions as being somewhat insincere when the US Sixth Fleet anchored at Naples was ready to assist Israeli belligerence. It was this mutual distrust that served as a backdrop to the crisis. Suez was also about the Egyptian regime trying to realize its military and economic ambitions. Nasser, still smarting from the memories of defeat in the Arab-Israeli war in 1948, wanted a strong military. But a cotton glut and the fact that over 80 percent of Egyptian foreign currency came from cotton exports meant that the finances were not available to buy arms. US intransigence to sell arms pushed Nasser into the Russian orbit. When Nasser concluded the Czech arms deal in 1956 with a purchase of $90 million using Egypt’s cotton surplus, he effectively killed two birds with one stone. It further antagonized Egypt’s relationship with the West. Nasser also looked to the construction of the Aswan High Dam as the solution to Egypt’s economic woes. According to a recent World Affairs Study, the dam promised to increase the percentage of arable land by 33 percent and produce 600 million kilowatts of electricity annually. However, the regime, wanting favorable loan terms, overplayed its hand by courting both Anglo-American offers as well as Soviet ones. The Americans and the British, yet again suspicious of Egyptian intentions, revoked the offer, so when the Russian offer went cold Egypt did not have the means to fund the project. In order to finance the dam, Nasser took a huge gamble and in an act of dramatic defiance nationalized the canal. Opening the gates of hell Western reaction was fierce. The British determined to destroy the project by overloading the water way with shipping. Late Prime Minister Anthony Eden hoped to demonstrate that without British expertise the Egyptian project was finished. But when the Egyptians managed to keep the canal open, he resorted to more Machiavellian methods. Although UN mediation continued, British, French and Israeli ministers met in a Paris suburb to plan the invasion of the Sinai Peninsula. An Israeli invasion of the Sinai would be followed up by a charade: the French and British would insist on the belligerents ceasing fire, Egypt would naturally refuse and British and French troops would retake the canal as peacemakers. Their prediction was right: Egypt refused and British and French paratroopers landed in Port Said on November 5, 1956 despite heavy resistance made at Suez as British fighter planes pounded Cairo. The Anglo-French military action drew international condemnation. The US administration, annoyed that it had not been consulted and its shipping unable to pass, withheld vital financial aid. USSR leader Nikita Khrushchev, busy crushing the Hungarian uprising, threatened nuclear Armageddon as the Arab world stopped the supply of oil to the Western invaders. The French and British were forced to back down, leaving Egypt in a curious position of having been militarily defeated and yet emerging victorious. The psychological impact of the conflict cannot be overstated. Nasser brought about a sense of defiance and strength in the Egyptians. As the academic Fuad Ajami suggests, although Nasser does not fare well as a leader in terms of successes and failures, his value lay in his symbolic contribution to the Egyptian imagination. And that is the point: Nasser’s defiance over the Suez crisis hinted, however faintly, at Egypt’s potential. Suez gave birth to hundreds of Nassers, the late Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi being only one of his many incarnations. However, it also instilled a certain hubris that embroiled these men in disastrous foreign adventures like the Yemen war in the 1960s. Above all, Suez contributed to the crystallization of the military’s influence on Egyptian society. The Suez crisis was also significant to the West. The Times described Eden’s decision to invade as “the last Prime Minister to believe that Britain was a Great Power and the first to confront a crisis which proved beyond doubt that she was not.” The last thrash of empire not only killed Eden’s political career, but also left an indelible scar on British foreign policy. Since then, Britain has not acted without securing US support in its military adventures. The decline of British influence in the Middle East signaled the entry of the US determined to secure its vital interests. In the process of doing so, it to fell into the same trap that Britain had fallen into.