| Egypt shifts its foreign policy in its relations with Israel By Randa El Tahawy |
| Egypt’s foreign policy is experiencing a shift. It might not be something issued in a press release, but even the least politically savvy observer will tell you that the direction of the country’s foreign policy has changed significantly since the ousting of former President Hosni Mubarak. With this shift, Egypt is repositioning itself and its role in the Middle East, a move likely to impact its relationship with its neighbors, especially in terms of its relationships with Israel and the US.“I think that we are going to see a more nationalistic policy, and that is going to include a much harder line when it comes to Israel,” says Scott MacLeod, editor of the journal Cairo Review of Global Affairs, published by the School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at the American University in Cairo (AUC). “It is going to lead to a more balanced relationship with the United States as Egypt’s interests will be much more vocalized and insisted upon in the relationship with the United States.” At the end of April, former Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabil Al Araby announced the reopening of the Rafah crossing with Gaza, stating that “important steps to ease the blockade” would start in the coming days. Egypt has also halted construction of an underground steel wall designed to stop weapons smuggling through tunnels along its border with Gaza, an allegation repeatedly made by Israel over the past few years. The bold decision to open the Rafah border indefinitely is one of the first indications of a clear shift in Egypt’s relationship with Israel. The move was welcomed by many, but also raised concerns for Israeli officials in terms of security-related issues. “I think that the opening of the border was meant to bring Egypt more in line with popular opinion,” says MacLeod. Egyptians have long been critical of the government’s policies toward Israel, which were perceived as being aligned more with Israeli and US interests than with the general public sentiment towards the Palestinian people. Ami Pedahzur, a professor at the Department of Government and Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Texas at Austin, thinks the move shouldn’t be a threat to Israel, as long as the Egyptian army makes sure that Hamas is not smuggling more weapons or militants into the Gaza Strip, which could threaten Israeli security. He also thinks it is a good decision. “This would probably release the pressure and would be good for the people of Gaza,” he says. “I think the biggest concern for Israel is what’s going to happen security wise, how is [the Egyptian government’s decision] going to affect border security?” While security might be the priority for Israel, this doesn’t necessarily have to mean it should be the priority for the Egyptian government. Walid Kazziha, the chair of the Political Science Department at AUC, argues that, in fact, opening the crossing was a step that had to be taken since there was no real reason for Egypt to close the border crossing in the first place. “It is the most logical, humane and natural thing to do. The Palestinians in Gaza are not the enemies of Egypt, why should we close the border with the Palestinians?” Kazziha says. “There is no reason [to] close the border [just] because the Israelis wish us to do so.” To experts, this decision reflects a strategic one by the leadership to move toward a policy that reflects the will of the people, leaving behind the old regime’s stances on the Palestinian-Israeli issue. Kazziha says this is a logical consequence of the January 25 Revolution. “I think the new political processes in Egypt do not support the previous policies of Mubarak, which were quite [pro-Israel],” he says. MacLeod argues that the Mubarak regime followed policies that were very much in the interest of the regime and not the people. “Many things regarding the regime’s policies towards the Palestinians or Israel were done with a view of ‘how can this help us as a regime?’” he says. “We are now erasing the separation that existed between Egypt’s strategic interest and the Mubarak regime’s personal interest.” But times have changed, and, as analysts explain, Egypt is moving toward a democracy where people are able to express themselves. Under this up-and-coming democratic system, the government’s policies will have to represent the perspective of the general public as opposed to that of the regime. “A democratic country and a democratic audience do not understand or approve the oppressive nature of the Israeli regime in the West Bank and Gaza,” says Kazziha, adding that a democratic Egypt would not tolerate seeing its neighbors continuing to live under such oppressive rule. The Cold Peace Egypt and Israel have been in what experts call a “cold peace” for the past 35 years, with the sentiments of the average Egyptian citizen being very antagonistic toward Israel. Pedahzur explains this reaction by noting that the Egyptian people did not support the peace treaty signed by President Anwar Sadat in the first place. “They [the government] knew that the Egyptian people do not support the peace,” he says, “and that even the Mubarak regime didn’t really try to create a more positive atmosphere towards Israel.” As a result, Egyptians are still very conflicted about whether or not they want this peace agreement. In a recent poll conducted by the US-based Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, results showed that more than half of all Egyptians would like to see the 1979 peace treaty with Israel annulled. And with the control exercised over free speech under the Mubarak government lifted, this animosity against Israel was front and center last month as Egyptian protesters gathered outside the Israeli embassy to commemorate the Palestinian Nakba (Catastrophe), in reference to the day when Israel became a recognized state by the United Nations in 1948. The protesters set fire to an Israeli flag, chanted anti-Israeli slogans and called for the expulsion of Israel’s ambassador and the closure of the embassy. The protest turned violent, leaving over 350 protesters injured and 150 arrested. “There is this very basic primordial layer of animosity that has to be removed, and I doubt that this would be an easy process because Israel was never accepted,” says Pedahzur. “Many Israelis have very strong positive feelings toward Egypt and the Egyptian people, and I wish it was mutual.” Despite the popular sentiments against the peace treaty, analysts say there isn’t any indication that ties between both countries would come to an end, and that the Camp David accords are highly unlikely to be abrogated. “Even if many Egyptians were not enthusiastic about it, the treaty was in their interest,” explains MacLeod, “and Egypt has a lot lying on its commitment to peace and the international advantage it gets from adhering to its commitment.” This sentiment is echoed within Israel. Some of that country’s scholars, such as Pedahzur and Israel Gershoni, a history professor at Tel Aviv University, argue that maintaining the peace is essential for Egypt, and that it can only benefit both countries. “The peace treaty is the most important element in the relationship between Israel and the Arab world since […] late 1973,” says Gershoni. “I do believe that it will endure. Both Israel and Egypt have a fundamental interest in this.” This is about more than just bilateral relations. This is also about military aid. Pedahzur says both countries have a very strong incentive to hold on to the existing agreement, especially when it comes to military affairs. Israel and Egypt are respectively the top two recipients of American military aid, and nullifying the treaty would end the military aid they receive since it is part of the overall agreement. This is likely to have a greater impact on Egypt than it would on Israel. Pedahzur also adds that the peace process has achieved everything in Egypt’s interest except for the Palestinian issue that stands between Israel and the Arab world. “I find it hard to believe why — if you take out all these conspiracy theories that are very common in the Middle East — would the average Egyptian object or rationally feel strongly against the peace with Israel?” he says. Kazziha disagrees, noting that Egypt has gone beyond the Camp David Agreement requirements under the Mubarak regime and made many concessions to please the Israel and the US. “The Camp David Agreement does not require Egypt to suppress the Palestinians and besiege the Palestinians in the Gaza strip,” he says. “It does not require Egypt to build an iron wall against the Palestinians.” In Kazziha’s view, there is a section of the agreement that can be renegotiated when it comes to Egypt’s ability to exercise its full sovereignty over its territories and deploy armed forces within its own border. “This part of the agreement may have to change,” Kazziha says. “It will have to change not to threaten Israel or to create tension on the borders, but it is to liberate Egypt internally and externally from any inhibitions on its ability to exercise its full right of sovereignty. Like the Israelis, the Americans exercise their sovereignty over their land. The Egyptians must have this right and Camp David restricts that right.” Among the security arrangements stipulated in the peace treaty, Article 4 creates “limited force zones in Egyptian and Israeli territory” with international observers monitoring the zones in both countries to ensure compliance. Anxious Neighbor With all the tension in the region and the unpredictable nature of Egypt’s future, Israel is anxiously awaiting the outcome. “Everything is so vague, and I think that mostly there is a lot of concern in Israel — there is a kind of basic fear of ‘what is going to happen next?’” says Pedahzur, adding that people are afraid that Egypt will revert to being an enemy. Up until 1978, Egypt was seen as Israel’s strongest opponent, and the memories of the 1967 and 1973 Wars are “devastating and still bitter,” he says. Israel also has fears of what will happen within Egypt domestically, especially in light of the rise of Islamic political movements in general and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular. Pedahzur explains there is a growing fear that the Muslim Brotherhood might gain influence over the political system. That, coupled with the fact that many Egyptian intellectuals are strongly anti-Israeli, is making many nervous. The issue of the Muslim Brotherhood can particularly be very threatening, as it is considered in Israel as being similar to Hamas, despite that the Muslim Brotherhood, unlike Hamas, has renounced violence. “There are some militants who are really a source of concern for Israel,” says Pedahzur. “I think that a very basic fear of Hamas is a big deal, it is not something that can be taken lightly.” But other experts think Israel should be concerned about the new order emerging in the Arab world. Those within Arab political systems that tacitly tolerated Israeli policies in the region have either been ousted, are on their way out or are worried that strong ties with Israel could aggravate their people. “[Israel] should be very anxious because they had a kind of status quo in the region for 25 or 30 years [and] they were left very well alone to deal with their neighbors, and especially with the Palestinians, as they would like to deal with them,” says MacLeod. “They had a kind of carte blanche to act in many ways in the region and now this freedom of action is very limited.” This could mean that Israel might have to reassess its policies if it expects to hold on to whatever borders it has right now. Israel might also be losing its close strategic relationship with Egypt, which appears to be shifting its support to the Arab countries, and, as such, might have to consider changing its policies. “I think Israel needs to worry in the long term about the status of its policies, which are unjust and are opposed in the Arab world,” MacLeod says. “If they don’t change their policies eventually, they will be overwhelmed with the masses of 200 or 300 million Arabs who are claiming the rights of Arabs in this region.” Emphasizing the security threats inherent in Egypt’s policy shifts, Pedahzur clearly thinks that Egypt could feasibly turn against Israel. However, he also acknowledges that a sense of insecurity is in the very basic nature of Israel. “Israel never feels safe in this neighborhood; it’s a very basic psychological cultural thing,” he notes. “People fear, and fear can generate a very harsh response.” Kazziha, on the other hand, argues that a bigger point of concern for Israel should be the fact that Egypt might be regaining its popularity on the Arab front, which could lead to more Arab mobilization against Israel. “Egypt is emerging [as] a role model,” says Kazziha. “It is not calling for Arab unity. [But] it is emerging as the biggest Arab society, which is moving to democratic arrangements internally, and I think this is the biggest worry as it will become the attraction [for other Arab countries].” The Emerging Mediator Egypt is slowly attempting to reclaim its leadership role in the Arab region and has already asserted its role in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. Last month, Palestinian factions Fatah and Hamas signed an Egypt-brokered reconciliation pact, agreeing to form a national unity government. The accord ended a four-year rift between the two groups. Kazziha calls Egypt brokering the reconciliation deal the “most momentous decision of the revolution” in Egypt. “We have to know that before, we were playing the role that was required from us basically by the Israelis,” he says. “We were sabotaging and vetoing the reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. Now, with the new regime coming to power, we have a new policy.” MacLeod thinks the reconciliation is a sign that Egypt is taking a more central role in the Palestinian-Isreali peace process is for the better. “We will probably wait for the elections and a new constitution before we really see Egypt’s full weight in the peace process,” he says, “but I believe it is a very positive thing for the region.” Gershoni also praises the role of Egypt in the peace process and thinks the country should continue these efforts, but it should also press Hamas to recognize Israel as a state and adopt the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s (PLO) decisions of November 1988 and the Oslo accords of 1993. With Egypt’s current popularity in the region, Pedahzur says that many achievements can be made for the peace process,especially if Egypt acts in good faith. The country could gain a lot from it in the international arena, and its credibility could increase dramatically. “Egypt, if it uses the right rhetoric and good faith, can put a lot of pressure on Israel to withdraw from the West Bank, for example,” he says. “This is a golden era for Egypt, it is considered as a very hopeful place.” Hopes are high for the future of the peace process, but, given the deep domestic issues Egypt is consumed with, it is clear that real change in the region could take some time. However, with the new political stances that the country is choosing, there is an indication that history will not repeat itself. As Kazziha notes, “The will of the people is that we are not going to be friendly to the Israelis or the Americans or any power until we get our rights and the Arabs and the Palestinians take theirs.” |
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