Scenarios expected after Qatari rejection to the Arab demands

Cairo - 2 July 2017: With only one day before the concluding 10 day window given to Qatar to respond to the demands set forth by four Arab states, political experts explore the potential fallout if Qatar rejects the demands.

The Qatari foreign minister on Saturday said that the 13 demands made to Qatar by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and Egypt, were designed to be rejected. This statement raises questions about the expected response from Qatar and any potential changes in the security of the region.

Gamal Mazloum, the former head of research center at Gamal Abdel Nasser Academy, told Egypt Today that disputes with Qatar are expected to continue, but they will remain being political and diplomatic boycotts against supporting terrorism in the region and not shift to a military dispute.

“We are still at the beginning of the conflict, but we should expect nothing more than economic sanctions, especially since no one has made military threats to Qatar,’’ the expert continued.

However, Mazloum commented on the Turkish military movements in Qatar, saying that their presence provides protection for the Qatari authorities that fear an opposition coup.

Following cutting ties in June, Turkey sent troops to be deployed in Qatar and filled around 105 Turkish cargo planes with food. The troops aim to protect the Qatari regime and train Qatari soldiers.

Reda Shehata, former Egyptian deputy minister of foreign affairs, said “what Qatar is doing will not only impact the situation of the ruling family but also the people of Qatar and the security of the entire region in the Gulf,” adding that Qatar’s practices of supporting terrorism have subjected the region to Iranian and Turkish intervention.

He further suggested that Qatar will continue resorting to major powers to resolve the conflict with its Arab neighbors, such as the United States or its economic partners in the west.

However, Shehata confirmed that western countries will not want to interfere in such a dispute or take a supportive position of a certain side, as their role would be limited to calling for political dialogue. In particular, the U.S. does not consider the Arab countries crisis with Qatar as a threat to its economic interests, but a regional Arab conflict.

In a similar context, Mazloum called on international foreign companies to cut cooperation with Qatar, especially those which significant investments in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt.

He also suggested that Qatar’s rejection of the 13 demands could result in its withdrawal from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), affecting the economic, political and military aspects of Qatar.

Mazloum further suggests that Qatar’s membership in the Arab League could be revoked or suspended as a result of their rejection of the demands.

Mazloum and Shehata’s opinions strongly suggest that Qatar should reconsider its rejection of the Arab states demands; otherwise its diplomatic and economic conditions will face further deterioration. In addition, the four Arab states will look for different ways to escalate efforts to limit, and ultimately end, Qatar’s alleged funding and support of terrorist groups.

In late June, Egypt, the UAE, Saudi and Bahrain sent Kuwait to Qatari authorities with a number of requests to be approved. Among the requests were severing ties with terrorist groups, closing down the pan-Arab Al Jazeera satellite channel, downgrading ties with Iran and closing a Turkish air base in Qatar.