Russia and Syria are not allies, only strategic partners

CAIRO – 21 August 2017: As the air of revolution swept through the Middle East in 2011, wheels began to turn around the world. Instability is often interpreted as a sign of weakness, and powerful states began instigating elaborate designs for how they could manipulate the situation to advance their own geo-political ambitions.

Since the beginning of the Cold War, countless wars have been hijacked by the U.S. and Russia (formally the Soviet Union) in the struggle for hegemony. From the Vietnam War, to Afghanistan, to the Syrian Civil War today, these two great powers continue to capitalize on instability to directly and indirectly antagonize the other in their fight for dominance.

In contrast to other actors in the Syrian conflict, Russian involvement came at the request of Bashar al-Assad, and since 2015 it has been committed to upholding the Syrian government. With the power to strike down any UN Security Council resolution and the power to strike down any militia, without Russia’s political and military support Assad would not enjoy the comfort he does today.

Putin “rescued the Syrian regime and helped it crush the opposition,” Michael Kofman, security analyst for the Centre for Naval Analyses and Wilson Centre fellow, said to The Independent on May 8.

However, commentators often make the mistake of referring to Russia and Syria as allies. This is not the case. Putin has manipulated the situation to reap the political and economic fruits of Syria’s reconstruction, and Assad cannot refuse vital Russian backing.

Russia does not have allies, only strategic partners. Although when taken at face value these two concepts may appear very similar, their truth in reality, and what they entail, is wholly different.

A strategic partnership is a bilateral agreement which is more important than many other relationships, and manifests itself in many ways. Although they are most associated with defense or security related issues, they cover a wide range of matters and open doors for further cooperation. Such partnerships are ‘strategic’, in that both countries share ambitions which can be accelerated through said partnership.

However, the term ‘ally’ implies an emotional investment in the relationship, which often entails military or defense cooperation though collective security. Russia has not enjoyed the benefits of a significant military alliance since the Warsaw Pact, which collapsed along with the Soviet Union in 1991.

Yes, Russia is providing Assad vital military support, but this relationship is not bi-directional.

Alexander III of Russia once stated famously that Russia has only two allies: the army and the navy. Echoing this 19th century past, Putin concurred with Alexander III, arguing that “everybody feels scared at the vastness of Russia,” during the Direct Line Q&A session on April 14, 2016.

"I proceed from the assumption that we are not going to have a war with anybody. We will certainly be strengthening our defense precisely for the sake of ensuring nobody develops the wish to be at war with Russia," Putin continued.



Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and Hafez al-Assad in 1977


Russian-Syrian diplomatic ties were established in 1944, and were greatly enhanced with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1980. However, this was a Cold War relationship, and was dictated by the rules of the bi-polar political atmosphere. Many Cold War alliances were conditioned by emotion, and relationships were bi-directional.

Today the story is different. Putin has invested significant military capital into the war in Syria, with little to no emotion. From Putin’s perspective Russia has kept Assad in power and guaranteed certain provisions in the future, strengthening Russia’s hand in the region.

The purpose of the direct military involvement of the US-led coalition has been to defeat the Islamic State (IS) and oust its members from the territory they command. As this anti-IS battle comes to a slow but sure end, the atmosphere will change. The US-led coalition will have a harder time defending their involvement in the conflict, whereas Putin will continue to act unrestrained.

As the struggle becomes increasingly dominated by direct conflict between pro-government forces and the ‘traditional’ opposition, principally the Free Syrian Army, the more controversial Russia’s involvement will become.

New light will be shed on Russia’s support for Assad and the ethical concerns behind its campaign. In this sense, the ousting of IS from its territory is not directly favorable for Russia’s motives.

Nevertheless, this will not matter. The crimes committed by Russia in Syria, whether legal or moral, have never been hidden from the public eye.

Disconcerting for some, and welcoming for others, Putin remains in the best place to dictate Syria’s post-conflict resolution.

“After reversing the Turkey and US policy for President Assad’s ousting, eliminating would-be alternatives to the current regime, and capturing most of the population centers, Russia is well placed to dictate terms for post-conflict settlement,” states Michael Kofman.



A [new] SU-34 Sukhoi striking an enemy position in Syria (Aleppo or Racca region) with a KAB-500S, a satellite-guided 560 kg bomb

Putin’s objectives in Syria are wide-ranging, from: maintaining the strategic port at Tartus; to showcasing the destructive capacity of Russian made weapons to the world; to solidifying political influence over the construction of gas pipelines through Syria, Russia has a lot to gain and even more to lose from the war in Syria.

Most importantly, however, Russia aims to challenge the influence and arrogance of the U.S. in respect to the Middle East.

Echoing the rhetoric of the Cold War, Russia feels that U.S. hegemony in the Middle East must be challenged, and it is no secret that Putin hopes to undermine the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Russia’s successful campaign in Syria is one step towards Russia’s ambition of reestablishing the global balance of power.

“We must attempt to retain the necessary strategic balance of power,” Putin said at the St. Petersburg International Forum in 2016. Although he was discussing the U.S.’s missile defense system and the retaliatory expansion of Russia’s nuclear arsenal, this inherent belief arguably underpins Russia’s entire foreign policy.

Trump’s presidency has forced a major shift in U.S. policy toward the war in Syria. Last month, the Washington Post reported that President Trump had ended a CIA program, initiated under Obama in 2013, to fund rebels fighting against the Syrian government.

This was a firm indication that the U.S. does not seek to militarily oppose Russia’s mission any longer, and the U.S. mission is limited to the air campaign against IS and supporting Kurdish forces in this mission.

“Putin won in Syria,” a current official anonymously said to the Post.

With the U.S. now taking the back foot, one can assume Putin will aim to solidify Russia’s influence over Syria and the region. Not only will Russian influence propagate from Syria, but its actions will also bring regional actors in favor of Russia.

Major regional actors such as Lebanese militant group and political party, Hezbollah, and Iran, have been active supporters of the Syrian government. Although they may exhibit differences with the Russian government, this relationship can only strengthen as Russia guarantees Assad’s hold over Syria and a break from regional Sunni dominance.

“As anywhere else, political instability provided an opportunity for local scores to be settled, for personal grievances to be aired, for heroes to be acclaimed and discarded, giving full reign to the fickle fortunes of war.” – Charles Emmerson, 1913: In Search of the World Before the Great War